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Tax Reform in Japan

Not Enough Yen
to Balance
the Budget /
^

J
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by HIROTAKA FUKUYAMA / International
Tohmatsu Awoki& Co., Tokyo

Tax Services

L

ike other industrialized and energy-dependent countries hit hard by
the oil crisis in 1973, Japan has been struggling the last few years to
balance its federal budget. In the f o l l o w i n g article, Mr. Fukuyama
traces his government's unsuccessful attempts to d o so by means of fundamental changes in the Japanese tax laws. [Editor]

In 1973, before the first oil crisis, Japan
maintained an annual economic
growth in real terms of approximately
10 percent. As company profits and
individual taxpayer income grew year
by year during this high-growth period,
so did tax revenue. This revenue was
enough to finance almost all government spending and avoid having to
issue government bonds to finance any
revenue shortage. During this period,
the Ministry of International Trade and
Industry proposed various tax incentives
almost every year, and the Ministry of
Finance usually gave favorable consideration to these proposals, knowing
that economic growth eventually
resulted in an overall increase in tax
revenue.

When the effects of the first oil crisis
began to be felt, the character of the
Japanese economy began to change, as
did the government's fiscal policy. In
the last two quarters of fiscal 1974,
Japan experienced a negative growth
in GNP, the first since World War II.
Between then and 1980, GNP rose once
again but only to about half of what it
had been before the oil crisis. After the
second oil crisis hit in 1980, that growth
further slowed to 2 or 3 percent. But to
maintain even this level of growth,
government spending had to sustain
approximately an 18 percent annual
increase, because the government had
pushed up public works spending.
With corporate earnings and wage
earners' income deteriorating, tax
revenue did not increase at the same
rate as public spending. Therefore, to

finance this growing spending, government bonds had to be issued. The value
of these bonds increased from 20
percent of federal spending in 1974 to
35 percent in 1978 and after.
At the same time, the tax incentives
incorporated in income tax laws had
been squeezed to the maximum in
spite of opposition by business circles.
The corporate income tax rate, including local income taxes, was about
54 percent (56 percent after 1980), and
the individual income tax rate structure
had a very sharp progressive pattern: 57
percent on incremental income over
$40,000 (y10 million), 71 percent on
income above $80,000, and 93 percent
on income over $320,000, with an
average ceiling of 80 percent on total
income.
In Japan, the ratio of income tax to all
types of taxes, including local taxes, is
70 to 74 percent, which is considerably
higher than the ratio is in European
countries. For example, in France it is 38
percent, in Germany 50 percent, and
in the U.K., 60 percent. Thus, it was
decided that only non-income taxes
would allow for increase.

as many groups as possible. One of its
concerns was that VAT would be
inflationary. Due to a lack of public
support, however, the VAT law was
never actually voted on in the Diet,
Japan's legislature. Any new tax law is
always unpopular with the public, and
the government party did not want to
lose votes in the 1979 general election.
At about the same time as VAT was
proposed, Japanese tax authorities
suggested a system of taxpayer serial
numbers to prevent tax evasion. Under
the current tax law, a taxpayer can pay
tax on interest and dividend income in
one of two ways. He may pay a tentative
20 percent withholding tax upon
receipt of such income and then
include such interest and dividends in
his annual return, for which he pays
progressive rates of income tax based
on his aggregate annual income; or, he
may pay a 35 percent withholding tax
without being required to state his
annual aggregation of interest,
dividends, and all other income.
Moreover, a tax exemption for interest
income is permitted, with a ceiling of
$12,000 (y 3 million) on the principal

amount of savings producing interest in
any of three groups of savings: postal
savings, government bonds, and a
third group, including bank deposits,
corporate bonds, debentures, and loan
trusts.
Effective January 1,1984, however, the
government has proposed to abolish
the nonaggregated 35 percent
withholding tax system and exercise
more strictly the ceilings for interest
exemption. As a current practice,
financial institutions have no choice but
to accept savings without any assurance
from a depositor that the total sum of
savings has reached the ceiling. The
taxpayer serial number system is
strenuously opposed by both voters
and the political parties, mainly because
of possible infringement of taxpayers'
privacy.
The Green Card System
In place of the original taxpayer serial
numbers system, the government has
proposed an alternative—the Green
Card System. Under this plan, if a
taxpayer wants to have tax-free savings,
he must request a Green Card from the

Taxable Alternatives
With individual income tax rates so
high, it was clear that there would be
no room for a further increase, nor
would the slow growth in corporate
profit and individual income produce
tax revenue sufficient to satisfy everincreasing government spending—
especially on such controversial items
as social insurance (medical expenses
and pension), National Railroad assistance, and agricultural subsidies. So
instead, the government proposed a 5
percent value-added tax (VAT), to take
effect on April 1,1980. Its objective was
to have more people share the tax
burden.
Because VAT would be passed on to
consumers regardless of their income
bracket, the government made every
effort to get a consensus of opinion by
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district tax office and then submit that
card to his financial institution, which is
required to confirm whether or not he
has reached the interest exemption
ceiling. The Green Card summarizes his
interest-ceiling status.
The government succeeded in
passing the Green Card System legislation in March 1980, with a 45-month
moratorium and an implementation
date on or after January 1,1984. The
reasons that the system has succeeded
thus far are that only wealthy people
will be affected, that the moratorium
period is lengthy, and that "green"has a
nice sound to it.
As its implementation date nears,
taxpayers have started to recognize the
likely impact of the Green Card. Interest
income on savings in excess of the
ceilings ($36,000 of principal for all
three types of savings) could be taxed
at 93 percent, if annual income exceeds
$320,000, and at 61 percent, if income is
between $48,000 and $60,000. A savings
principal of $36,000 is not an overly
significant amount in Tokyo, however.
For example, an apartment with 700
square feet of floor space and located
an hour's commuting distance from the
heart of Tokyo costs about $200,000.
To escape the Green Card System,
some depositors are taking their savings
and moving them to other investments.
One indication of this is that postal
savings have been slowing down. In
March of last year, a record net
withdrawal of $1.3 billion was registered. And the import of gold for the
first half of 1981 was five times greater
than it was a year earlier, when gold
fever quickly broke with the sharp drop
in gold prices.
"Zero Coupon Bonds"
Those not buying gold have been
making a rush, particularly since the
beginning of last year, to acquire
so-called "zero coupon bonds"—
original-issue discount bonds denominated in foreign currency—because they
consider such bonds to be beyond the
control of the Green Card System. In
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February alone, a massive $780 million
worth of these bonds was purchased by
Japanese investors. Under the current
law, it is true that capital gains from
sales of shares, bonds, and debentures
are, in principle, tax free to the
individual taxpayer. However, originalissue discount bonds are taxable to the
bond holders at the time they mature
and are redeemed, although no
withholding tax is imposed if the bonds
are issued outside Japan. Thus, if a bond
holder sells a zero coupon bond before
its maturity date, no Japanese tax will
be imposed on the gain from its sale.
To prevent investors from circumventing the Green Card System, the
Ministry of Finance (MOF) formally
notified all security companies in
March to refrain for the time being
from selling zero coupon bonds. The
MOF feels that this will decrease the
outflow of capital from Japan, which
appears to be one of the leading factors
for strengthening the yen. Tax authorities also have recommended that this
year's revision in the tax law include a
reporting requirement by securities
companies to identify the purchasers of
these bonds. Due to foreign exchange
regulation, securities companies
currently sell zero coupon bonds to a
customer's account without actually
delivering the bond certificates to that
customer. With the imposition of the
reporting requirement, bondholders
might be wary about purchasing more
bonds because the tax authorities could
trace the source of cash.
In the past few months, opposition to
the introduction of the Green Card
System has increased sharply, due to
signs that tremendous shifts of money
are about to trigger major disruptions of
the money market. The ruling political
party has proposed a three-year freeze
of the law and has deferred its implementations from 1984 to 1987.
One of the reasons for the Green
Card freeze is that this system might
have an adverse effect on Japan's ratio
of savings to disposable income.
Compared to that in western countries,
this ratio has been extraordinarily high.
It peaked at 24.3 percent in 1974 and
declined to 20.6 percent in 1981. This

may be compared with 4.3 percent in
the U.S. and 9.5 percent in West
Germany in 1979.
The high rate of savings has made
available vast amounts of funds for
corporate investments in plants and
equipment, which in turn supported
the high economic growth in Japan
before the first oil crisis. Since then, this
savings has been a primary source of
funds for purchasing government
bonds. Without sufficient savings, the
issuance of great numbers of government bonds would have led to high
inflation, as well as to the crowding out
of corporate borrowers from the capital
market.
Conclusion
For the last few years, the Japanese
government has been unsuccessful in
making a fundamental change in the tax
laws. And while a powerful Members
Committee has been organized to plan
for a smaller government, people feel
that such a plan would be difficult to
implement.
Without either an increase in tax
revenue or a decrease in government
spending, the government's revenue
shortfall will have to be financed by the
sale of bonds, the outstanding balance
of which has reached almost 40 percent
of Japan's GNR Assuming that the
interest rate on these bonds is 8 percent
per annum, the government's annual
interest payments amount to 3.2
percent of GNR But because the
government budget is roughly 20
percent of GNP, 16 percent of the
government budget must be used for
interest payments.
People agree that there needs to be
some fundamental change in Japanese
fiscal policy, but they do not like to
change their own lives.
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